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signify the same; then it would be as valid to infer that whatever was a
man necessarily was not a two-footed animal as to infer that whatever
was a man necessarily was a two-footed animal, i.e. it would be no more
valid to make the latter inference than to make the former. But, of
course, Aristotle cannot hold that both these inferences are valid, so
long as he maintains the PNC, so he must say either that neither is or
that 'man' and 'not-man' do not signify the same. But, then, in the
absence of proof that 'man' and 'not-man' do not signify the same, his
opponent could say that he had no right to assume that either was
valid—given his acceptance of the PNC. And so Aristotle provides such
a proof.1 As Aquinas puts it:
Now the things demonstrated above are useful to his thesis, because if
someone were to think that the terms man and not-man might signify the
same thing, or that the term man might signify both being a man and
not being a man, his opponent could deny the proposition that man must
be a two-footed animal. For he could say that it is no more necessary to
say that man must be a two-footed animal than to say that he is not a
two-footed animal, granted that the terms man and not-man signify the
same thing, or granted that the term man signifies both of these—being a
man and not being a man.
1 In opposing the PNC Aristotle's opponent is not denying that some of the things
Aristotle believes are true, but rather is claiming that more things may be true than Aristotle
believes to be possible, viz. the contradictories of some of the true propositions which
Aristotle believes. Thus it is natural for him to confront any argument Aristotle puts forward,
not by denying its validity, but by proposing another argument whose conclusion is the
contradictory of the conclusion of Aristotle's argument, and then challenging Aristotle to
explain why just his argument is valid. I take the purpose of the paragraph beginning at
1006b 13 to be to forestall just such a challenge.
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FURTHER NOTES ON FUNCTIONS
By PATRICK GRIM
MY beloved stuffed moose head is functioning as a hat rack, andoccasionally functions to hold coats and umbrellas. But it is really
a decorative, rather than functional, addition to my study; it is the
function of my hat rack to hold hats, and a function of the coat rack to
hold umbrellas. The moose head often functions only to frighten small
children.
Attention to the many different ways in which we speak of functions
is called for by the flurry of recent work done on the topic, and especially
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January, 1976). Boorse's article involves a critique of Larry Wright's
original formulation for functions (Philosophical Review, April, 1973),
using in part counter-examples similar to my own (ANALYSIS 3 5.2, 1974).
Wright seems to recognize the force of such an attack (ANALYSIS 36.3,
As a critical piece, Boorse's article has much in its favour. Boorse
also attempts, however, to supply what Wright as of this writing has not:
an adequate account of precisely what it is that talk of functions amounts
to. In the end, I think, Boorse's proposal is less satisfactory than the
account it is designed to replace.
Boorse claims that 'functions are, purely and simply, contributions to
goals' (p. 77), and offers an analysis of 'X is performing the function
Z . . .' on the basis of an outline of 'goals'. He goes on to discuss 'the
function of Xis Z' and 'a function of Xis Z' in terms of 'Xis performing
the function Z . . .' The three main steps in his presentation are thus: (1)
the outline of 'goals', (2) the analysis of 'X is performing the function
Z . . .' in terms of 'goals', and (3) the transition from 'X is performing
the function Z . . .' to 'the function of Xis Z' and 'a function of Xis Z \
I hope to point out important difficulties which arise with each step.
I
Boorse first specifies 'goals', following Sommerhoff in Analytical
Biology, as follows
To say that an action or process A. is directed to the goal G is to say not
only that A. is what is required for G, but also that within some range of
environmental variation A. would have been modified in whatever way was
required for G (p. 78).
Boorse discusses two objections to such an account proposed by
Scheffler {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 9, 1959), and alters
the outline of 'goals' in terms of them. The first objection Boorse
considers and attempts to resolve as follows
Presumably a cat which waits by an empty mousehole may have the goal
of catching a mouse; but it is hard to see how any behavior can literally
be required for catching a nonexistent mouse. The cat's behavior can,
however, fairly be called appropriate to catching a mouse; it is, for in-
stance, the kind of behavior that leads to catching mice when they are
there. And this answer seems sufficient... (p. 79).
What Boorse is proposing, I think, is the following amendment of
the outline of 'goals' above:
To say that an action or process A is directed to the goal G is to say
not only that A is what is required for G or appropriate to G-ing, but
also that within some range of environmental variation A would have
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Cat and mouse problems, and perhaps even Scheffler's original cat
and mouse problems, remain. Suppose that kitty lurks around empty
mouseholes with the goal of catching mice. Not only does it appear that
lurking around empty mouseholes is not required for catching mice, it
also appears that lurking around empty mouseholes is totally inappro-
priate to catching mice. Nor, in the end, is 'lurking around empty
mouseholes' the kind of behaviour which leads to catching mice when
they are there, since if there are mice in the hole kitty's 'behaviour' can
no longer be described as 'lurking around empty mouseholes'. Lurking
around mouseholes may lead to catching mice when they are there, but
no logically respectable cat could possibly lurk around empty mouseholes
full of mice.
We can, of course, make things still worse for the formulation.
Poor kitty, demented as she is, commonly does totally unrequired and
inappropriate things with the goal of catching mice. If Boorse's formu-
lation for 'goals' were correct, we would be forced to say that doing
totally unrequired and inappropriate things is here required for or
appropriate to catching mice.
Boorse also considers a second difficulty, and once again revises the
account of 'goals' in terms of it. So as to avoid difficulties with 'be-
haviours' required for or appropriate to several ends, Boorse specifies
that
When a process appropriate to several ends at once has a true goal, I
suggest it is because the process is produced by an internal mechanism
which standardly guides pursuit of that goal but not the others (p. 79).
With that amendment, the entire formulation becomes:
To say that an action or process A is directed to the goal G is to say
not only that A is what is required for G, or appropriate to G-ing and
if appropriate also to any other X-ing is produced by an internal mechanism
which standardly guides pursuit of G but not of any other X, but also that
within some range of environmental variation A would have been
modified in whatever way was required for G.
The attempt to avoid one type of difficulty here, I think, quickly
raises another. Thus consider the following case. Kitty's one central
goal in life is to appear sinister, and everything she does is guided by that
goal in one way or another. She often crouches as if to pounce, silently
glaring and extending her claws, solely in order to appear sinister.
Should some additional need to catch mice or annoy her mistress arise,
kitty's central goal of appearing sinister will guide these efforts as well;
she catches mice and annoys her mistress in as sinister a manner as
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(little electrical trails in kitty's brain, perhaps), m is part of the 'mechan-
ism' of everything kitty does.
Kitty is at present crouching near the mousehole, silently glaring and
extending her claws, and is doing so merely with the goal of appearing
sinister. Such behaviour is also appropriate to catching mice or annoying
her mistress, of course, but kitty's goal in this case is merely the familiar
one of appearing sinister. Here the formulation above would seem to
require that kitty's present 'behaviour' be 'produced by an internal
mechanism which standardly guides' the attempt to appear sinister but
does not standardly guide other attempts such as catching mice or annoy-
ing her mistress. But this is not the case; kitty's goal here, as well as
whatever 'mechanism* goes with it, are such that they guide everything
kitty does and thus do not guide merely the kind of thing she is doing
at the moment. As it stands, the formulation above seems to exclude
all such cases. If Boorse's account were correct, in fact, neither kitty
nor anyone else could act solely in pursuit of a goal which also standardly
guided the pursuit of other goals.
There finally seems to be some difficulty in the 'would have been
modified' clause of the formulation. Certainly I might have a goal G
which I know can only be accomplished by doing some very simple A or
some very strenuous A'. I do A with the goal of G, but had A failed
to produce G I would have totally abandoned G rather than subject
myself to the rigours of A'. Here action in terms of a goal seems obvious,
though the specifications of the formulation are not fulfilled in that my
action would not have been modified within any 'range of environ-
mental variation . . . in whatever way was required for G*.
Boorse's attempt is not simply to clarify ordinary notions of goals,
since he wants to label thermostats and guided missiles as 'goal-directed'
as well and speaks of 'goal-directed behaviour outside of the realm of
intentional action' as something like 'a theoretical concept of biology to
be explicated according to convenience' (p. 78). To that extent, his
earlier claim that 'functions are, purely and simply, contributions to
goals' (p. 77) becomes misleading without inverted commas around
'goals' and a clarificatory footnote. But Boorse also seems to want his
formulation to present necessary conditions for 'goals' in the ordinary
sense, or at least to avoid difficulties of a type he considers, and with an
eye to either of these standards he appears to have failed on three
counts.
II
For the sake of argument, however, we might allow Boorse's
discussion of goals as a discussion of 'goals' in a particular sense, and
consider his definitional efforts as purely stipulative ones. All of this
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Boorse offers the following as an account of 'what is perhaps the
weakest of all functional attributions'
Xis performing the function Z in the G-ing of S at /, means
At /, Xis Z-ing and the Z-ing of Xis making a causal contribution to the
goal G of the goal-directed system S (p. 80).
'G' and '/ ' here are variables for goal and time. *S* stands for 'system', a
term for which we are never really given an explanation.
I must confess to some difficulty with the phrase 'is performing the
function Z' simply because it sounds so pretentious (much as 'believe'
commonly sounds in speaking of what people think and as 'performing
the action a' commonly does in speaking of what people do). I hope my
words are functioning to get my message across, but to say that I
hoped they were 'performing the function of getting my message across'
would seem at least unnecessarily awkward. Boorse, in fact, never
uses precisely that phrase in context. 'Is functioning to' seems a more
natural candidate for the 'weakest of all functional attributions', but
I don't want to saddle Boorse with a phrase he did not attempt to
analyse.
Neither phrase, however, seems right when we are speaking of
people in certain situations, and for that reason Boorse's account faces
a simple form of counter-example. Thus consider a Rube Goldberg
contraption the goal of which is to produce pretty patterns on an
oscilloscope. Rube has set the whole thing up in such a way that it relies
in part on the snoring of Professor Emeritus, who knows nothing of the
device and is lost to the world. In such a case it may be that Professor
Emeritus is snoring and his snoring is making a causal contribution to
the device's production of pretty patterns on the oscilloscope. But it
would seem odd to say either that Professor Emeritus is performing the
function of snoring, or that Professor Emeritus is functioning to snore.
We can make the case worse by building a device which relies on
Professor Emeritus lying there unconscious or even dead (we want a
flat EEG reading, perhaps). Though he may be lying there unconscious
or dead and that may contribute to the goals of the 'system', it would be
very strange to claim that Professor Emeritus is either functioning to
lie there unconscious or is performing the function of lying there dead.
Other difficulties face Boorse's account as well. Though he speaks of
it constantly as an analysis of 'performing the function' and even at one
point as an analysis of 'performing a function', his account is strictly
speaking an analysis rather of the complex phrase 'performing the
function Z in the G-ing of S at /'. As such, even if the account were
successful, it would not follow that 'functions are, purely and simply,
contributions to goals' (p. 77) nor that 'to accept our analysis of per-
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function is—namely, a contribution to a goal' (p. 81). The phrase for
which he presents an analysis is one which requires the mention of
some particular 'goal' (as a substitution for 'G-ing') and thus the claim
that such a phrase can only be analysed in terms of some 'goal' is a
foregone conclusion and a fairly uninteresting one. The least that is
required to substantiate Boorse's more general claims that 'functions
are, purely and simply, contributions to goals' is an analysis in terms of
'goals' of some subspecies of function talk which need not explicitly
mention 'goals'.
Boorse may have intended his analysis to be more than it in fact is;
the account is followed immediately by the claim that 'all functional
statements, weak and strong, seem to me implicitly relative to system,
goal, and time' (p. 80), and he speaks later of 'variables suppressed' in
'function statements' (p. 85). If Boorse intended his account to cover
cases where 'goals' are not explicitly mentioned, the following examples
suggest direct counter-examples in terms of both 'performing functions'
and 'functioning to'. Boorse's specific analysis aside, such examples
make implausible any account of the form required to substantiate his
more general claims regarding the necessity of an analysis in terms of
'goals'. Thus consider:
(1) The advertising department has for twenty years been perform-
ing a function detrimental to all goals of the company, society at
large, and even the department itself.
(2) The seniority committee is to this day performing a function
inimical to all goals of the legislative branch and government in
general. (Give it a new name and it would simply be the same
committee performing the same function inimical to the same goals.)
(3) The vast distances of space are functioning to prevent com-
munication between us and our nearest star.
(4) The force of the current is functioning to sweep small boats
quickly out of little boys' reach.
Each of these would appear to resist analysis in terms of 'goals', (1) and
(2) because they explicitly deny that the work of the advertising de-
partment or the seniority committee furthers any goals which might
seem relevant in such an analysis, and (3) and (4) because there seems to
be no 'goal' in sight appropriate to such an account. Only if the waters of
the world were in conspiracy against little boys would (4) fit such an
account, and only if the universe were plotting against interstellar
communication would (3) go through. There need be no such goals in
any of these cases in either the common sense of the term or in that
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'within some range of environmental variation A. would have been modified
in whatever way was required for G' (p. 78). But none of these cases need
be ones in which anything would have changed. Departments and
committees remain out of apathy, and rivers don't change their courses
suitably to the loss of small boats.
Ill
Boorse's third attempt is to move from an account of 'performing
the function Z' to a broader outline of 'the function of X ' and 'a function
of X'. Like its two predecessors, I think, this step in Boorse's discussion
faces its own peculiar difficulties.
Whatever 'the' or 'a' function of a thing is, then, it must at least be a
contribution to a goal... what more is required for a function performed
by X to be among 'the functions' of X is not any fixed general property
but instead varies from context to context (p. 81).
Boorse's final accounts read:
'A function of X is Z' means that in some contextually definite goal-
directed system S, during some contextually definite time interval /, the
Z-ing of X falls within some contextually circumscribed class of functions
being performed by X during /—that is, causal contributions to a goal
Gof S.
'The function of Xis Z' means that in some contextually definite system S
with contextually definite goal(s) G, during some contextually definite
time interval /, the Z-ing of X is the sole member of a contextually
circumscribed class of functions being performed during / by X in the
G-ing of X—that is, causal contributions to G (p. 82).
These are not, Boorse warns, to be taken as analyses 'in the sense
of two-place synonymy relations', precisely because of contextual
variance. A very major problem arises with respect to the general
attempt here nonetheless.
In his original article, Wright notes that
The function of that button on the dashboard is to activate the wind-
shield washer, even if all it does is make the mess on the windshield
worse . . . That would be its function even if I never took my car out of
the garage—or broke the windshield . . . If the windshield wiper comes
from the factory defective, and is never repaired, we would still say that its
function is to activate the washer system . . . (p. 146).
Boorse rejects this general claim out of hand as a 'curious ruling'
(p. 73), but in fact Wright was correct first time around and this very
point indicates an essential problem with Boorse's attempt to derive
'a function' and 'the function' from 'functions being performed'.1
1 Strangely enough, Boorse considers this problem briefly in a footnote (p. 83) which
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Some things have a particular function, and the function they have is
of a certain nature, despite the fact that there is no time / at which or
during which they are performing that function, functioning, or even
function**/. The function of the light switch in the west bedroom is to
turn on that light. But the electrician hooked it up wrong. It doesn't,
and cannot perform any useful function and will probably never be
functional. The function of a crab's claws is to ward off aggressors.
That's true even of Charlie the crab's claws, though Charlie lives alone
in my aquarium and will never meet any aggressor; there will be no time
/ at which Charlie's claws are functioning to ward off an aggressor.
The function of Snowball's ears is to allow her to hear things, despite
the fact that she is a white blue-eyed cat and there is nothing known to
science which would allow the poor dear to hear things.
If Boorse's account were correct, moreover, we could never decide
whether something had a particular function without knowing whether
it ever would so function. A perfectly functional windshield wiper
switch might never be used, or the entire car might explode before
anyone gets close to the switch. But we need not wait and see whether
any such thing happens before declaring its function to be the wiping
of windows.
Thus the attempt to get 'a function' and 'the function' from 'is
performing the function' seems doomed, as doomed as the attempt to
define 'functioning' or 'is performing the function' in terms of 'goals'
and as doomed as Boorse's outline of 'goals' itself.
IV
The notion of 'functions' and the attempt to give a clear account of
it are important enough for all contributions to be applauded, and
Boorse's work is important as a critique of accounts which have pre-
ceded it. For a more adequate account than those he criticizes, however,
we must look elsewhere.1
1 I am much indebted to Ms Kriste Taylor for the loan of her linguistic ear.
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